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I. INTRODUCTION
IT IS A cool autumn afternoon, and you have the after-
noon free. The business deal you have been working on
went perfectly, and the day is turning out to be just as per-
fect. Perfect, that is, for flying. There are not any clouds
for miles, the breeze is light, and the temperature is cool
but not too cold. You feel good. In fact, you feel so good
that you decide to fly your plane. You bought the plane, a
single-engine two-seater, a few years ago, and you have
never had any problems with it in the past.
As you arrive at the airport, you decide to do something a
little different. Instead of flying from your regular seat, the
700
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pilot's seat, you decide to fly the plane from the co-pilot's
seat. The controls and the view seem slightly different from
the co-pilot's seat, but other-wise, flying from the co-pilot's
seat seems no different.
As always, your take-off is flawless. Once you are in the
air, you decide to cruise at a few thousand feet. The plane
is flying like a dream, and, after a few hours, you decide to
venture to a nearby lake. The lake's airport is small and
only a few miles straight ahead. You have never been to this
airport before, but, like every other flight of yours, your ap-
proach is perfect.
Unbeknownst to you, there is a blind spot in the field of
view from the copilot's seat that is not present from the pi-
lot's seat. Because of this blind spot, you do not see the
trees in front of the runway. Before you realize it, your
right wing and the bottom of your aircraft hit several trees
and you spin out of control. Your plane spins to the right,
skids across the runway, flips over, and finally comes to a
complete stop.
Due to the accident, you incurred many medical bills,
your plane was completely destroyed, and you missed sev-
eral months of work. Because of the enormous bills you
have accrued, and your desire to make the responsible par-
ties "pay" for what they caused, you decide to sue the air-
craft manufacturer in state court. Should you be allowed to
do so? After all, it was the manufacturer's fault for not de-
signing the aircraft correctly, and you would never have
been injured if it had not been for the design flaw. In addi-
tion, you believe that companies who make a defective
product should be taught a lesson. From an injured per-
son's point of view, the company probably should be held
responsible.
Consider the same situation from the perspective of the
aircraft manufacturer. The aircraft manufacturer worked
hard to build every aircraft to meet its customers' needs
and desires, while remaining in compliance with every Fed-
eral Aviation Administration requirement. This is a diffi-
cult situation for the aircraft manufacturer. Even if its
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aircraft have always complied with every Federal Aviation
Administration regulation and standard, the aircraft manu-
facturer may still be sued based on a standard that is de-
cided by a jury of lay persons in a state court. The aircraft
manufacturer could not have designed the aircraft in view
of this standard because it did not exist at that time. In
addition, each state may hold it to a different standard, and
each one of these standards may be more strict than the
ones promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration.
In future designs which standard does an aircraft manufac-'
turer rely upon in order to avoid future law suits? In addi-
tion, how does it design aircraft to meet standards that do
not yet exist?
As the title and the previous hypothetical situation sug-
gest, this article was written to review the arguments for and
against preemption of state law tort claims in the context of
aircraft manufacturers. Within the past year, two cases have
addressed this issue in the United States Courts of Appeals.
The first case was decided in the Tenth Circuit,' and the
other was decided in the Eleventh Circuit.' While both
courts concluded that the state common law tort claims
were not preempted by federal action, there are many legit-
imate and persuasive arguments that support the opposite
conclusion. This comment will present both sides of the
argument, without relying solely on Piper Aircraft or Lake Air-
craft, to allow the reader to come to his or her own
conclusion.
This comment is divided into several sections. The first
section addresses the history of the relevant federal aviation
acts and regulations and the responsibilities and duties of
the Federal Aviation Administration. The second section
discusses the general status of law regarding federal pre-
emption, and the third section discusses the status of'pre-
emption regarding the field of aviation. The last two
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 291 (1993) [hereinafter Piper Aircraft).
Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291 (11 th Cir. 1993) [herein-
after Lake Aircraft].
TORT CLIM PREEMPTION
sections provide an analysis of the law and suggestions for
change.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT REGULATION PRIOR TO THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In 1926, the first basic federal aviation statute, the Air
Commerce Act of 1926,' was created. The 1926 Act placed
the responsibility of regulating air commerce on the Secre-
tary of Commerce, but it also gave responsibility for other
areas of air transportation-particularly in the military con-
text-to the President and the Secretary of War.4 In addi-
tion, the 1926 Act gave the Secretary of Commerce the
power to regulate aircraft design and the materials and
methods used in the fabrication of aircraft.5 Because of the
prevailing view of state and federal officials when the 1926
Act was created, however, the Act was read as regulating air-
craft operating only in interstate and international com-
merce, and left the regulation of aircraft operating
intrastate to the individual states.6 Because of the problems
arising from various regulations adopted in the different
states, Congress urged the states to adopt "uniform laws and
regulations corresponding with the provisions of [the 1926
Act] and the rules and regulations that [were] promulgated
under it."7
Subsequently, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act8
in 1938 in order to unify the independent aviation agencies
of the federal government. This Act created the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority, which was later divided into the Civil Aer-
onautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics
The Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (repealed in 1938)
[hereinafter 1926 Act].
4Id.
5 1926 Act, 44 Stat. at 569.
6 See S. REP. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1925), rpinted in CVIL AERONAUTICS:
LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF THE AIR COMMERCE Acr OF 1926 29 (Rev. ed. 1943).
7 Id.
a The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (repealed in
1958).
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Administration (CAA). 9 The CAB became a subordinate
organization under the Department of Commerce and had
responsibility for safety rule-making, economic regulation,
and accident investigation in the context of air commerce.
The CAA was placed under the control of the Secretary of
Transportation in the Department of Commerce, and was
also given limited responsibility for safety rule-making and
accident investigation.
B. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In August of 1958, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the
1958 Act) was enacted.10 The 1958 Act created the Federal
Aviation Agency, later known as the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), and reaffirmed the existence of the
CAB. In addition, the 1958 Act abolished the CAA and re-
placed it with the FAA. The 1958 Act gave the newly-cre-
ated FAA the responsibility for flight safety and gave the
CAB responsibility for economic regulation of commercial
airlines.
1. Purpose of the 1958 Act
During the enactment of the 1958 Act, the House of Rep-
resentatives stated that "[t] he principal purpose of [the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958] is to establish a new Federal
agency with powers adequate to enable it to provide for the
safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace by both civil
and military operations."" Thus, Congress's purpose in
creating the FAA was to promote safe air travel, and to pro-
tect lives and property on the land and in the air.
2. Provisions of the 1958 Act
Under the 1958 Act, the FAA's responsibility for flight
safety of civil aircraft includes prescribing and revising
rules, regulations and standards, as well as issuing certifica-
9 Id.
10 This was later codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).




tions for aircraft, pilots, and mechanics. 12 According to the
House Report,
the [FAA] (1) would be given full responsibility and author-
ity for the advancement and promotion of civil aeronautics
generally, including the promulgation and enforcement of
safety regulations ... [tihe new Federal Aviation Agency
would be headed by a civilian Administrator with plenary
authority to ... (d) [m]ake and enforce safety regulations
governing the design and operation of civil aircraft."3
More specifically, the Secretary of Transportation, who was
charged with all of the powers and duties of the FAA, was
given the authority to regulate "[s] uch minimum standards
governing the design, materials, workmanship, construc-
tion, and performance of aircraft... as may be required in
the interest of safety. 14 In addition, the Secretary of Trans-
portation was given the authority to prescribe "[r] easonable
rules and regulations" governing the inspection of aircraft,
including the manner in which such inspections may be
made. '-
a. Certifications Issued by the FAA
In order to assure the aviation industry's compliance with
the rules, regulations, and standards established by the Sec-
retary of Transportation and the FAA, Congress established
a multi-step certification process. This certification process
is codified in Sections 1423(a)-(c). 6 The first step of the
certification process is the issuance of a "type certifica-
tion.""'7 In order to obtain a "type certification," an aircraft
12 See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1421-27 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
isHR. EP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1-2 (1958), 7repinted in 1958
U.S.C.CA-N. 3741-42.
14 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(1) (1988).
15 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(3) (1988).
16 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1423(a)-(c) (1988).
17 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a) (1988). Section 1423(a) specifically states:
(1) The Administrator [Secretary of Transportation) is empowered to
issue type certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers; to
specify in regulations the appliances for which the issuance of type
certificates is reasonably required in the interest of safety; and to issue
such certificates for appliances so specified.
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manufacturer must show, by appropriate analysis and test-
ing, that the proposed design meets the applicable safety
and airworthiness standards as dictated by the Secretary of
Transportation and the FAA.18 According to Section
1423 (a) (2), either the FAA or the aircraft designer is re-
quired to make "such tests during manufacture and upon
completion as the Secretary of Transportation deems rea-
sonably necessary in the interest of safety."19 Hence, these
tests can be conducted by the aircraft designer on a proto-
type of the proposed aircraft. If this is the case, FAA em-
ployees or their representatives are required to review the
data and conduct the further tests deemed necessary by the
FAA. 20
Moreover, in order to start production of the aircraft, the
aircraft manufacturer must obtain a second certification, re-
ferred to as "production certification." 21 An aircraft manu-
(2) Any interested person may file with the Administrator [Secretary
of Transportation] an application for a type certificate for an aircraft,
aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance specified in regulations under
paragraph (1) of this subsection. Upon receipt of an application, the
Administrator [Secretary of Transportation] shall make an investiga-
tion thereof and may hold hearings thereon. The Administrator [Sec-
retary of Transportation] shall make, or require the applicant to make,
such tests during manufacture and upon completion as the Adminis-
trator [Secretary of Transportation] deems reasonably necessary in the
interest of safety, including flight test and tests of raw materials or any
part or appurtenance of such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or
appliance. If the Administrator [Secretary of Transportation] finds
that such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is of proper
design, material, specification, construction, and performance for safe
operation, and meets the minimum standards, rules and regulations
prescribed by the Administrator [Secretary of Transportation], he shall
issue a type certificate therefor. The Administrator [Secretary of
Transportation] may prescribe in any such certificate the duration
thereof and such other terms, conditions, and limitations as are re-
quired in the interest of safety. The Administrator [Secretary of Trans-
portation] may record upon any certificate issued for aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propellers, a numerical determination of all the essential
factors relative to the performance of the aircraft, aircraft engine, or
propeller for which the certificate is issued.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a) (1988).
I8 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a) (2).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(b) (1988). Section 1423(b) specifically states:
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facturer may only apply for a "production certification"
after a "type certification" is properly obtained for the par-
ticular type of aircraft that is to be built. In order to obtain
a "production certification," the aircraft manufacturer must
prove to the FAA that it has established, and can sustain, a
quality control system that will assure a consistent produc-
tion of aircraft that will meet the design requirements of
the "type certification." 2 As in the case of the "type certifi-
cation," the FAA "may require any such tests of any aircraft
... [a] s may be necessary to assure manufacture of each unit
in conformity with the type certificate."2"
The third and final certification required in this certifica-
tion process is the "airworthiness certification." 24 This certi-
Upon application, and if it satisfactorily appears to the Administrator
[Secretary of Transportation] that duplicates of any aircraft, aircraft en-
gine, propeller, or appliance for which a type certificate has been is-
sued will conform to such certificate, the Administrator [Secretary of
Transportation] shall issue a production certificate authorizing the
production of duplicates of such aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers,
or appliances. The Administrator [Secretary of Transportation] shall
make such inspection and may require such tests of any aircraft, air-
craft engine, propeller, or appliance manufactured under a produc-
tion certificate [a]s may be necessary to assure manufacture of each
unit in conformity with the type certificate or any amendment or mod-
ification thereof. The Administrator [Secretary of Transportation]
may prescribe in any such production certificate the duration thereof
and such other terms, conditions, and limitations as are required in
the interest of safety. "
49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(b) (1988).
nId.
"Id.
24 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(c) (1988). Section 1423(c) specifically states:
The registered owner of any aircraft may file with the Administrator
[Secretary of Transportation] an application for an airworthiness certif-
icate for such aircraft. If the Administrator [Secretary of Transporta-
tion] finds that the aircraft conforms to the type certificate therefor,
and, after inspection, that the aircraft is in condition for safe opera-
tion, he shall issue an airworthiness certificate. The Administrator
[Secretary of Transportation] may prescribe in such certificate the du-
ration of such certificate, the type of service for which the aircraft, the
type of service for which the aircraft may be used, and such other
terms, conditions, and limitations as are required in the interest of
safety. Each such certificate shall be registered by the Administrator
[Secretary of Transportation] and shall set forth such information as
the Administrator [Secretary of Transportation] may deem advisable.
The certificate number, or such other individual designation as may
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
fication is required before any particular aircraft may be
placed in service and must be obtained by the registered
owner of the aircraft."5 In order to obtain an "airworthiness
certification," the FAA must find "that the aircraft conforms
to the type certificate . . .and, after inspection, that the
aircraft is in condition for safe operation."26 In addition,
under Section 1430, it is unlawful for any person to operate
an aircraft in air commerce without a valid "airworthiness
certification."27
An additional certification is required when an aircraft
has been subjected to a major alteration in its particular
design.28 This certification is referred to as a "supplemental
type certificate." In order to obtain a "supplemental type
certificate," the applicant must present test data that is suffi-
cient to prove to the FAA that the modified aircraft meets
all of the appropriate airworthiness standards. 29 These air-
worthiness standards may be the same as the standards re-
quired to obtain a "type certification." 30
The FAA also has the responsibility for monitoring the
service history of aircraft certified by the FAA. In view of
this service history, the FAA can issue an "airworthiness di-
rective" for aircraft that are believed to require either a de-
sign modification or a manufacturing modification.31 Once
a particular aircraft receives an "airworthiness directive," it
then has its "airworthiness certificate" suspended or re-
voked until the required changes are made. In addition,
the specific type-class of aircraft may have its "type certifica-
tion" suspended or revoked if a particular design or manu-
facturing flaw is found to be prevalent in a specific type of
be required by the Administrator [Secretary of Transportation], shall
be displayed upon each aircraft in accordance with regulations pre-




27 49 U.S.C. app. § 1430(a) (1988).
14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1993).
- See 14 C.F.R. § 21.115 (1993).
30 Id.
s, See 14 C.F.R. § 39.1 (1993).
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aircraft. The manufacturer will be required to incorporate
the design or manufacturing changes mandated by the "air-
worthiness directive" into all new aircraft of the particular
type that received the "airworthiness directive." Further-
more, owners and operators of aircraft of the particular
type-class that received the "airworthiness directive" are re-
quired to modify their aircraft so as to comply with the
design or manufacturing changes mandated by the "airwor-
thiness directive."
b. Savings Clause
In addition to including provisions that established the
FAA and delegated responsibility to it, the 1958 Act in-
cluded a "savings clause" provision. 2 The savings clause
states that any common law or statutory remedies that ex-
isted when the 1958 Act was enacted are not to be pre-
cluded by the 1958 Act.33
C. POST-FEDERAL AVIATION Acr OF 1958 DEVELOPMENTS
In 1966, Congress enacted legislation changing the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency to the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion. With this legislation Congress also established the
Department of Transportation and transferred responsibil-
ity for and control over the FAA to the newly created De-
partment of Transportation.
Subsequently, Congress passed the Noise Control Act of
1972.s4 This Act required the Secretary of Transportation
to conduct a study of various facets of aircraft noise
problems and report these problems to Congress. As a re-
sult of these studies, the Environmental Protection Agency
and the FAA were given responsibility for establishing regu-
32 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
33 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988). Section 1506 specifically states: "Nothing con-
tained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such
remedies." Id.
34 Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234.
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lation of aircraft noise in order to protect public health and
welfare.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation
Act .35 The purpose of this Act was to promote "an air trans-
portation system which relies on competitive market forces
to determine the quality, variety and price of air services." 36
The Airline Deregulation Act amended some of the ex-
isting provisions of the 1958 Act and added other provi-
sions. Two provisions are particularly important: First, the
Act allowed federal preemption of claims involving rates,
routes, or services of an air carrier;3 7  and second, it
brought about the gradual termination of the authority of
the CAB.5 8
With the addition of Section 1305(a), scholars suggest
that the primary purpose of the 1958 Act and the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 was to establish federal regulation
of both air safety and the "rates, routes or services" of air
carriers.3 9 In addition, the House Report regarding the Air-
line Deregulation Act stated that Section 1305(a) was in-
tended to "prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations"
caused by the lack of direction regarding the division of
regulatory authority between the states and the federal gov-
-5 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
primarily at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1389 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) [hereinafter Air-
line Deregulation Act].
6 Airline Deregulation Act, 92 Stat. at 1705.
-1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988) repealed by Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat.
1379 (1994). Section 1305(a) specifically states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this section, no State or
political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political
agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regu-
lation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law
relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority
under title IV of this Act to provide air transportation.
(2) Except with respect to air transportation (other than charter air
transportation) provided pursuant to a certificate issued by the Board
under section 401 of this Act, the provisions of paragraph (1) of this
subsection shall not apply to any transportation by air of persons,
property, or mail conducted wholly within the State of Alaska.
Id.
See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(b) (1988).
See Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1444 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 112
S. Ct. 2031, 2040-41 (1992)).
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ernment. 40 Prior to enactment of Section 1305, however,
federal and state authorities would charge different
amounts for flying between cities depending on whether
the excursion was interstate or intrastate.4 1 Therefore, a
question remains as to whether Section 1305(a) addresses
only the issue of rates and routes or whether it also ad-
dresses the issue of air safety.
While this point may seem to have been mooted by the
repeal of Section 1305(a) in 1994, the consideration of
Congress's intent is still important. The repeal of Section
1305(a) could be significant in this context because it illus-
trates the intentions of the present Congress. Section
1305(a) is still important, however, because it represents
the intentions of Congress at the time the Airline Deregula-
tion Act was enacted. 42 Therefore, Section 1305(a) contin-
ues to be important because it illustrates the intentions of
the framers of the Airline Deregulation Act regarding pre-
emption in the context of aircraft manufacturers. The ac-
tual implications of this repeal will be determined as new
cases are brought that try to interpret Congressional intent
in light of the repeal.
III. PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW REGARDING
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Congressional power to preempt state law is derived from
the Supremacy Clause of Article IV of the United States
Constitution. The breadth of this power was explained, and
criteria for determining whether a state law claim should be
preempted were developed, in Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Medical Labs.43 In Hillsborough, the Court stated that
"[u]nder the Supremacy Clause, federal law may supersede
40 H.R. REP. No. 95-12611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3752.
11 H.R. REP. No. 95-12611, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3751-3752.
42 See infra notes 162 and 190.
43 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
1994-1995] 711
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
state law in several different ways, including express and im-
plied congressional preemption."44
Express preemption occurs when Congress provides a
specific provision in a federal law. The Supreme Court ex-
plained that "when acting within constitutional limits,
Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating
in express terms."45 More recently, in English v. General Elec-
tric Co.46  the Supreme Court specifically stated that
"[p]reemption fundamentally is a question of
[c]ongressional intent, and when Congress had made its in-
tent known through explicit statutory language, the courts'
task is an easy one.
In the absence of explicit preemptive language, a state
law claim may still be preempted if Congress's intent to pre-
empt these claims "is implicitly contained in the federal
statute's structure and purpose."48 In Lake Aircraft the court
specified two types of implied preemption: "field preemp-
tion" and "conflict preemption."49
A. FIELD PREEMPTION
Field preemption arises "where the scheme of federal
regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable
the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplemen-
tary state regulation."5 0 In addition, the court in Hillsbor-
ough stated that "[p ] re-emption of a whole field also will be
inferred where the field is one in which 'the federal interest
4 Id. at 713.
45 Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
496 U.S. 72 (1990).
4, Id. at 78-79 (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.. 485 U.S. 293, 299
(1988)).
48 Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1398 (D. Haw.
1990) (quoting San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But see Piper Aircraft 985 F.2d at 1441 ("The mere fact that Congress has enacted
detailed legislation addressing a matter of dominant federal interest does not indi-
cate an intent to displace state law entirely.").
49 992 F.2d at 294 (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112
S. CL 2374, 2383 (1992)).
w Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
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is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' "51
In other words, "once Congress has taken up occupancy,
state laws attempting to regulate within the field 'will be in-
validated no matter how well they comport with substantive
federal policies.' "52 However, the Supreme Court, in Eng-
lish, expressed a different view. The Court stated that
"[w] here ... the field which Congress is said to have pre-
empted includes areas that have been traditionally occu-
pied by the States, [c]ongressional intent to supersede state
laws must be clear and manifest.""3
B. CONFLICT PREEMPTION
Conflict preemption arises "where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or
where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."54 Thus, "[e]ven where Congress has not occupied
the field, state law may nevertheless be preempted to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law."55
A state law claim may be preempted either by express lan-
guage in a statute56 or by implication of congressional in-
tent. Courts seem hesitant, however, to preempt state law
claims unless congressional intent to preempt can be
clearly and manifestly shown.
51 Id
52 French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Lnw-
RENcE H. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-27, at 497 (2d ed. 1988)). See
also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
33 496 U.S. at 79 (quotingJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
I Lake Aircraft 992 F.2d at 294 (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Manage-
ment Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992)).
- Holiday, 747 F. Supp. at 1400.
Hilisboru, 471 U.S. at 713. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
"state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes."
Id
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IV. PRESENT STATUS OF CASE LAW REGARDING
IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
AVIATION
A. FEDERAL CASES PERTAINING SPECIFICALLY TO IMPLIED
PREEMPTION AND AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS
Two cases have been recently decided by the United
States Court of Appeals that address the issue of federal pre-
emption of state law tort claims against aircraft manufactur-
ers. The first of these cases, Piper Aircraft,57 was decided in
the Tenth Circuit in February of 1993, and the second, Lake
Aircraft,58 was decided in the Eleventh Circuit in May of
1993.
1. Piper Aircraft
In Piper Aircraft, Edward Cleveland, the injured party,
modified an aircraft in order to film a television commer-
cial. With the assistance of an FAA-approved mechanic,
Cleveland removed the front seat of a tail-dragger aircraft59
and installed a camera in its place. However, neither Cleve-
land nor the mechanic received the proper approval from
the FAA to operate the aircraft with this modification. 6°
Prior to the date on which Cleveland planned to film the
commercial, the owner of the airport became concerned
about the safety of the aircraft and Cleveland's noncompli-
ance with the FAA standards and regulations for aircraft
modification. Due to this concern, the owner closed the
airport. However, on the day of the accident, the owner
noticed that Cleveland planned to use the runway despite
the closure. In order to prevent Cleveland from proceed-
ing with filming the commercial, the owner parked his van
on the runway to prevent take-offs and landings. Although
the runway was blocked by the van, Cleveland nevertheless
57 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993).
- 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993).
- A tail-dragger aircraft's landing-gear consists of one wheel under each wing and
one at the tail of the aircraft.




attempted to takeoff while piloting the aircraft from the
back seat. During takeoff, the aircraft struck the van and
Cleveland was injured. Cleveland's wife brought suit based
on a state law negligence theory. Mrs. Cleveland specifi-
cally pled that Piper negligently designed the plane so that
there was inadequate forward vision from the rear seat of
the aircraft. She also alleged that Piper negligently failed to
install shoulder harness restraints on the rear seat.
The original trial court returned a special verdict in ex-
cess of $1 million in favor of the Clevelands. On appeal,
the court held that the special verdict improperly restricted
jurors from allocating fault among the potentially responsi-
ble parties,6' and a new trial was subsequently awarded to
Piper. On remand, Piper was allowed to amend its answer
to include a defense that Cleveland's state law claims were
preempted by the 1958 Act and its associated regulations.
Subsequently, the trial court denied Piper's motion for
summary judgment, and limited the trial to the issue of lia-
bility. In addition, the trial court ruled that only the evi-
dence and witnesses of the first trial could be introduced
into the second trial. Piper appealed.
Due to the FAA's extensive authority and control over air-
craft design and manufacture, Piper argued that Congress
intended for the FAA to have exclusive control over aircraft
design and manufacture regulations. Therefore, Piper as-
serted that the 1958 Act impliedly preempts state tort ac-
tions by occupying the field of aircraft design safety. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument. In
support of its holding, the court relied on several different
theories.
First, the court relied on the fact that the 1958 Act ad-
dresses only the responsibilities of the FAA, the CAB, and
the air carriers, but does not address the responsibilities of
the states, if any exist.62 In several previous cases, however,
various federal courts allowed preemption based on the
premise that the 1958 Act was intended to set forth a uni-
61 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540, 1546-51 (10th Cir. 1989).
62 Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1442.
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formity of regulation. 3 Yet, the court in Piper Aircraft chose
not to follow these cases because it believed that they dealt
with regulation of pilots or noise and not with regulation of
aircraft manufacturers. 64
Second, the court relied on the presence of the savings
clause65 in the 1958 Act and the absence of any express pre-
emption clause regarding state tort claims.66 In the court's
opinion, this is a particularly compelling reason not to pre-
empt the state common law claims.67
Third, the court noted that the 1958 Act generally gov-
erns two broad areas and only one of these two areas, rates
and routes, contains an express preemption provision." In
view of this, the court held that if Congress intended to pre-
empt state tort law in the area of air safety, it would have
expressly provided for this, just as it had for the issue of
rates and routes.69
Fourth, in response to Piper's assertion that state com-
mon law duties conflict with the 1958 Act, the court stated
that in order to have "conflict preemption" there must be a
"physical impossibility to comply with both state and federal
law." 70  In this case, the court found that the 1958 Act
merely established "minimum standards"71 and noted that
compliance to stricter state standards would not be physi-
cally impossible in light of the standards set by the 1958
Act.72
a See, e.g., French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) (drug test-
ing); Northwest Airlines v. Gomez-Bethke, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837 (D.
Minn. Apr. 1, 1984).
Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1443 n.7.
See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
6 Piper Aircraft 985 F.2d at 1443 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112
S. Ct. 2031, 2034 (1992)).
67 Id.
- Id. at 1444.
66 Id. at 1443-44 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618
(1992)).
70 Id. at 1445 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
72 Piper Aircraft 985 F.2d at 1445.
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Finally, the court rejected Piper's argument that state tort
claims should be preempted in aircraft safety cases because
they are preempted in automobile safety cases. The court
distinguished a series of decisions, holding that state tort
claims are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) because the NTMVSA con-
tains an explicit "conflict preemption" clause. 73 In addi-
tion, the court suggested that if Congress intended to
preempt state tort law in the context of air safety, it would
have adopted a provision similar to that in the NTMVSA.74
Thus, Piper was unable to persuade the federal courts that
the federal regulatory scheme preempted Cleveland's state
common law tort claim, and the damage award for the
Clevelands was ultimately upheld.
2. Lake Aircraft
In Lake Aircraft William Dee was the sole passenger of an
airplane manufactured by Lake Aircraft. The pilot of the
amphibious aircraft attempted to take off from a lake, but
was unsuccessful. The plane crashed into a rock bank, and
Dee was seriously and permanently injured. Dee sued Lake
Aircraft under state common law alleging negligence and
strict liability. Dee claimed that the passenger's seat in the
aircraft was negligently designed and "but-for" this design
defect his injuries would not have been as severe. The trial
court ruled that Dee's state law tort claims were preempted
by the 1958 Act.75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.76
The court relied on the fact that Congress had expressly
preempted state law claims regarding rates and routes, but
had not expressly preempted state law claims regarding air-
7s Id. at 1447.
74 d.
75 Lake Aircraft 992 F.2d at 292.
76 Id. at 295.
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craft safety. 7 The court concluded that Congress had not
intended to preempt state law tort claims.7' Relying on the
decision in Piper Aircraft, the court further stated that "sec-
tion 1305 reliably indicates Congress' intent on state au-
thority to regulate civil aviation." 7' The court further held
that" [u] nder Cipollone, we conclude from section 1305 that
Congress did not intend to pre-empt state laws on matters
unrelated to airline rates, routes or services."80
In addition, the court stated that its decision was not in
"actual conflict" with the federal aircraft design regula-
tions.8 The court contended that Dee merely sought to
hold Lake Aircraft liable for not exceeding the minimum
standards for aircraft design promulgated by the 1958 Act.8 2
In support of this conclusion, the court relied on the fact
that federal aircraft design regulations permit the use of en-
ergy-absorbing seat designs, such as the ones that Dee pro-
posed that Lake Aircraft should have used.83 Therefore,
the court concluded that since its decision was based on the
fact that energy absorbing seats should have be used in the
design of the aircraft, and that federal regulations permit
the use. of such a design, there was no actual conflict. 84
B. RELATED FEDERAL AND STATE CASES
In addition to the cases discussed above, there are older
federal and state cases that address issues related to those in
Piper Aircraft and Lake Aircraft. The federal case, Holliday v.
Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc.,5 arose out of the district court
n Id.
7 Id. at 294.
7 Id. at 295.
-0 Lake Aircraft, 992 F.2d at 295. (citing Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (holding that
where there is a provision in enacted legislation which explicitly addresses the issue
of preemption, then the extent of the preemptive effect of that legislation should be
limited to that express language)).




- 747 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Haw. 1990).
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in Hawaii, and the state case, Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 86 was decided in the California Supreme Court.
In Holliday, William Holliday was injured when the heli-
copter he was flying lost power shortly after takeoff and
plummeted to the ground. The helicopter was manufac-
tured by Bell Aircraft Corporation (Bell) and had been re-
sold several times over the course of thirteen years.
Holliday alleged that the pilot's seat and seatbelt were de-
fectively designed, and, because of this, his injuries were ex-
acerbated when the helicopter crashed. These allegations
gave rise to Holliday's crashworthiness claim. In response,
Bell argued that Holliday's claim was impliedly preempted
by the 1958 Act. The court responded to Bell's argument
and addressed the issues of field preemption and conflict
preemption.
Regarding the issue of field preemption, the court stated
that Congress did not intend to preempt state law design
defect claims since the 1958 Act included a savings clause
which precluded a finding of such intent.87 In support of
this, the court stated that the 1958 Act was designed to com-
plement existing statutory and common law remedies, not
to take the place of them.8 In addition, the court reasoned
that state common law tort claims should not be impliedly
preempted based solely upon an aircraft manufacturer
meeting the minimum standards set out in the 1958 Act.89
Therefore, the court held that because of the inclusion of
the savings clause and the absence of a relevant preemption
clause in the 1958 Act, field preemption was not proper.90
Addressing the issue of conflict preemption, the court
stated that since the 1958 Act merely set forth minimum
standards governing the design and manufacture of air-
craft, a conflict did not arise between the 1958 Act and a
- 691 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1985).
87 747 F. Supp. at 1398 (citing West v. Northwest Airlines, 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.
1990)).
Id. at 1399 (citing Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, 541 F. Supp. 1338, 1345
(W.D. Pa. 1982)).
Id.
- Id. at 1400.
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state common law tort claim because the two could "func-
tion harmoniously rather than discordantly."91 The court
stated that there was no logical reason that an injured per-
son should be "barred from seeking recovery for their dam-
ages simply because the [FAA] overlooked or was unaware
of the defective condition at the time the aircraft was certi-
fied."92 Furthermore, the court concluded that "nothing in
the [1958 Act] indicates that states may not require aircraft
to be more safe or better designed." 3 Therefore, the court
held that Holliday's state tort claims were not preempted by
the 1958 Act.94
In Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,95 Edward Miro was killed
when his plane spun out of control and crashed. Miro's
heirs filed an action against Beech, the aircraft manufac-
turer, based on negligence per se. The complaint sought
damages for the accident and alleged that the accident was
the result of the defective design and manufacture of
Miro's aircraft as well as the failure to comply with federal
safety standards. The jury held for Miro's heirs, and Beech
appealed, asserting that Miro's heirs' claims were pre-
empted by the 1958 Act.
The California Supreme Court stated that there was
"nothing inherently inconsistent in the proposition that
even if the federal government has entirely occupied the
field of regulating an activity a state may simultaneously
grant damages for violation for such regulations."96 In sup,-
port of this statement, the court cited Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp.,97 which allowed state common law tort claims in the
context of nuclear safety regulation.9 In addition to
91 Id. at 1401 (quoting Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied 449 U.S. 983 (1980)).
- 747 F. Supp. at 1401.
93 Id.
94 Id.
691 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1985).
9 E/sworth 691 P.2d at 635.
- 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
N Id. at 256 (recognizing the tension between the belief that safety regulation is
the exclusive concern of federal law and the belief that a state may nevertheless
award damages).
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Silkwood, the California Supreme Court relied on the sav-
ings clause" included in the 1958 Act to support its conclu-
sion that state common law tort theories should apply to
actions related to design defects by an aircraft
manufacturer.100
Addressing the issue of conflict preemption, the court
reasoned that conflict preemption would apply if state law
presented either an irreconcilable conflict with or an obsta-
cle to federal laws or regulations. 10' The court held that
there was no irreconcilable conflict between the state and
federal standards in the context of this particular case for
several reasons.' 0 2 First, Miro's heirs were not challenging
the authority of the FAA to adopt regulations or to certify
aircraft compliance with them.'03 Second, they did not seek
to revoke the certification of this type of aircraft. 0 4 For
these reasons, the court concluded that as the state com-
mon law tort claim would have no effect on the FAA's au-
thority to certify aircraft, there was no irreconcilable
conflict between the state and federal standards. 0 5
In addition, the court held that state law claims did not
pose an obstacle to the federal regulatory scheme because
an inquiry in state court as to whether a manufacturer com-
plied with federal safety regulations would assist the FAA in
policing compliance with these regulations. 0 6 Further-
more, the court stated that state courts must reinforce and
strengthen the "complex and exacting scheme of regula-
tion developed by the FAA ... where it is apparent that
high standards consistent with the regulatory scheme have
not been maintained with resulting injury to persons and
See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
'0 Elsworth, 691 P.2d at 635 (stating that the 1958 Act "expressly declares that its
provisions are not intended to abridge remedies that a party may have under state





1- EL/orth, 691 P.2d at 635.
1- Id. at 636.
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property."10 7 In the context of this case, the court believed
that the state tort laws reinforced and strengthened the fed-
eral regulatory scheme and that Beech failed to maintain
these high standards. Therefore, the court held that Miro's
heirs' state common law claims were not preempted by the
1958 Act.108
C. ANALOGOus FEDERAL CASES
In addition to cases that directly address the issue of im-
plied preemption of state tort laws based on federal aircraft
safety regulations in the context of aircraft manufacturers,
there are several cases that address the issue of implied pre-
emption in analogous contexts. One such area relates to
state regulation of drug testing of airline pilots. Another
relates to state regulation of aircraft noise, and a third re-
lates to state-imposed curfews on airports.
1. State Regulation of Drug Testing of Airline Pilots
In French v. Pan Am Express, Inc.1t° an airline hired a pilot
to fly commercial aircraft. After receiving information that
the pilot used controlled substances, the airline ordered
the pilot to submit to a drug test. The pilot refused to take
the drug test, claiming that state law prohibited the airline
from forcing him to take it. Subsequently, the airline dis-
missed the pilot, and the pilot filed suit based on state statu-
tory law. The trial court dismissed the pilot's claim, and he
appealed.
On appeal, the airline asserted that the 1958 Act im-
pliedly preempted the pilot's state law claim. In response,
the pilot argued that since Section 1305(a) only explicitly
preempts state laws relating to "rates, routes and services,"
this implied that Congress only intended to preempt those
limited areas and not any others. The court of appeals re-
jected this assertion and stated that Section 1305(a) "af-
107 Id. (quoting in agreement with Fisher v. Bell Helicopter Co., 403 F. Supp.
1165, 1172 (D.D.C. 1975)).
108 Id.
109 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
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fords no basis for concluding that Congress meant to leave
states free to regulate on all other issues anent air safety
and pilot fitness."110
Moreover, the court looked to the history and purpose of
the 1958 Act to determine whether preemption of a state
statute was proper."' i The court concluded that since the
purpose of the act was to establish a uniform system of regu-
lation in the area of air safety and that the Secretary of
Transportation was given extensive authority in the field, it
would be assumed that the federal system would preclude
enforcement of state laws in the same subject.1 2 In addi-
tion, the court stated that if it upheld the state statute as it
applied to airplane pilots and a significant number of states
followed suit, then it would create fractionalized control
that would severely limit the flexibility of the FAA.1 13
Therefore, the court concluded that because of the com-
prehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme' 1 4 and the
purpose of the 1958 Act, state statutory laws regarding drug
testing of pilots were preempted by the 1958 Act.1 1 5
no Id. at 3.
I Id. at 5.
112 Id. at 5; see Northwest Airlines v. Gomez-Bethke, 34 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
837 (D. Minn. 1984).
I's French, 869 F.2d at 6.
14 The court felt that the federal regulatory scheme was comprehensive enough
to warrant preemption of state laws for several reasons. First, the court relied on the
fact that the 1958 Act assigned the overall authority to enforce regulations relating
to pilot qualification to the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA. Id. at 3. As an
example of this, the 1958 Act states that it is unlawful for any pilot who has not
received an "airman certificate," see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1430(a)(2) (1988), from the
FAA to fly any commercial aircraft. French, 869 F.2d at 3. Another example is that
the FAA was given the authority to determine the terms, conditions, and limitations
of each "airman certificate." Id. In addition, it is unlawful for any pilot to fly com-
mercial aircraft unless he is periodically recertified by the FAA. Id.
Second, the court relied on the fact that the 1958 Act gave the FAA great discre-
tion in determining the physical characteristics that are required in order to receive
an "airman certificate." Id. For example, a pilot must not have a medical condition
that the Federal Air Surgeon feels will make the pilot unable to safely perform his
duties. Id. at 4; see 14 C.F.R. § 67.13(a) (ii) (1988). Another example is that a pilot
must not have a history of chemical dependency. Id.; see 14 C.F.R. § 67.13(d) (i) (d)
(1988).
" French, 869 F.2d at 6-7.
724 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
2. State Regulation of Aircraft Noise and State-Imposed
Curfews on Airports
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,1 6 the city
council passed an ordinance which made it unlawful for a
pure jet aircraft to take off during the night and early
morning. In addition, the ordinance made it unlawful for
the operator of the airport to allow any such aircraft to take
off during that period. In a suit based on the ordinance,
the district court found the ordinance to be unconstitu-
tional. Subsequently, the court of appeals affirmed and
stated that the ordinance was preempted by the 1958 Act.
Even though the 1958 Act and the Noise Control Act of
1972 do not include an express provision preempting state
laws in the context of aircraft noise, the Supreme Court de-
termined that Burbank's noise ordinance would be pre-
empted if it conflicted with the actual federal regulations or
the objectives of the federal regulation." 7 In order to de-
termine whether there was a conflict, the Supreme Court
looked to several sources.
First, the Court reviewed both the Senate and House
Committee Reports relating to the enactment of the Noise
Control Act.118 These reports, and the President's state-
ment that "many of the most significant sources of noise
move in interstate commerce and can be effectively regu-
lated only at the federal level," supported the appellate
court's holding that the ordinance conflicted with the
Noise Control Act." 9
Second, the Court looked to prior federal cases relating
to the control of aircraft noise.' 20 In view of these cases, the
majority stated that "[c]ontrol of noise is of course deep-
seated in the police power of the States. Yet the pervasive
116 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
"' Id. at 633.
"' Id. at 634.
"9 Id. at 637-38 (quoting 8 WEEKLY COMP. Pmis. Docs. 1582, 1583 (Oct. 28,
1972)).
120 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 638. Cf Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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control vested ... in the FAA ... seems to us to leave no
room for local curfews or other local controls."1 21 In addi-
tion, the majority stated that if it were to uphold the Bur-
bank ordinance and other states followed suit, then this
would split control over aircraft noise between the states
and the FAA, limiting the flexibility of the FAA's control. 122
Therefore, the majority held that "the pervasive nature of
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise ... leads
us to conclude that there is pre-emption."1 2' However, the
dissent disagreed that Congress intended to preempt local
control of aircraft take-off and perceived a less extensive
federal role in the area of aircraft noise.1 24
In San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco 2 5 the Port
District, which owned the airport on which the suit was
based, attempted unilaterally to impose a prohibition
against all commercial jet takeoffs during specified hours of
the night. In addition, the prohibition would only allow
jets meeting a strict noise standard to land at the airport
during specified hours. However, the State of California
adopted a statute that would have required the Port District
to extend the specified hours. The Port District sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the California statute on the
grounds that "federal law preempts state regulation of air-
space management and control of the source of aircraft
noise. " 1 6
Relying on the holding of City of Burbank,127 the court
concluded that the California statute was impliedly pre-
empted because it conflicted with the federal regulatory
scheme and its underlying assumptions and intended pur-
121 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
122 Id.
12s Id. at 633.
124 Id. at 650-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the history of
prior congressional action in the field of aircraft noise demonstrated an intent to
allow local regulation, and, if not, it surely did not reflect a "clear and manifest
purpose" by Congress to prohibit the exercise of "the historic police powers of the
States" to regulate noise. Id. at 653.
1- 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
12 Id. at 1309.
2 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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pose. 128 While the court held that any attempt by the state
to directly control aircraft noise was preempted by the fed-
eral regulatory scheme, it also stated that indirect state con-
trol of aircraft noise was not preempted.12 9 In view of this,
the court indicated that states may adopt any means for re-
ducing aircraft noise, so long as it does not conflict with the
federal regulatory scheme or fractionalize the FAA's regula-
tory control over aircraft. 3 °
V. ANALYSIS OF THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER'S
AND THE INJURED PARTYS ARGUMENTS
The following is an analysis of potential arguments that
the aircraft manufacturer and the injured party could make
in support of their respective positions. Typically, a party
asserting that a state common law claim is preempted by
federal law would argue that preemption is explicit in the
federal law. However, in the context of this comment, this
argument does not carry any weight because the applicable
laws, specifically the 1958 Act, do not expressly preempt
state common law tort claims regarding aircraft manufac-
turers. Therefore, the parties' arguments will center
around the manifest intent of Congress and implied
preemption.
A. FIELD PREEMPTION
1. Aircraft Manufacturer's Arguments
Congress has the authority to occupy a field at the exclu-
sion of state laws.' Therefore, in situations where Con-
128 Gianturco, 651 F.2d at 1311.
"2 Id. at 1316.
1SO See id.
13, See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988). The Court in
Schneidewind specifically stated that:
Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to occupy a given field to
the exclusion of state law. Such a purpose properly may be inferred
where the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supple-
mentation by the States, where the federal interest in the field is suffi-
ciently dominant, or where the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it... re-
veal the same purpose.
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gress intends to solely regulate a field, federal laws preempt
state laws, because the federal laws and regulations govern
the field in a comprehensive manner and leave no room for
state laws or regulations.1 12
For the most part, aircraft are utilized for traveling a long
distance in a short period of time, and because of this, air
travel is a major source of interstate commerce. Therefore,
regulation of air travel by individual states would subject the
aircraft and its pilot to many different standards within a
single excursion. For this reason, many courts have con-
cluded that regulation of air travel is a national responsibil-
ity,' 33 as opposed to a state responsibility. In Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota'34 the Supreme Court stated that:
Congress has recognized the national responsibility for reg-
ulating air commerce. Federal control is intensive and ex-
clusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant
clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to
federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified per-
sonnel and under an intricate system of federal commands
.. . .Its privileges, rights and protection, so far as transit is
concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone and
not to any state government.13 5
Almost twenty-five years later, this statement was generally
reaffirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals.136 More
specifically, the court of appeals recognized Congress's in-
Id. at 300 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
132 However, federal laws have retained a role for state law tort remedies against
aircraft manufacturers in instances where the aircraft manufacturer has failed to
comply with FAA standards and safety requirements and was negligent in manufac-
turing an aircraft. See Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 691 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1984),
cert. denied, 47 U.S. 1110 (1985) (finding aircraft manufacturer liable in the design of
an aircraft on the basis of its violation of FAA safety regulations).
1 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633-644
(1973); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); French v. Pan
Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
134 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
135 Id. at 303.
'3 French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989).
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tent to establish uniform federal air safety regulations.1 37
The court stated:
The legislative history underlying the original [1958] Act
stressed the importance of a single uniform system of regu-
lation especially with regard to air safety. The [H]ouse re-
port explained, in a section entitled "Purpose of
Legislation," that "the administration of the new Federal
Aviation Agency (1) would be given full responsibility and
authority for the . ..promulgation and enforcement of
safety regulations." In a letter to the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, included as part of the
House Report, a representative of the Executive Branch
characterized the impetus behind the proposed legislation
as follows: ["] It is essential that one agency of government,
and one agency alone, be responsible for issuing safety regu-
lations if we are to have timely and effective guidelines for
safety in aviation. [] 138
In summation, the court stated that the "establishment of a
single uniform system of regulation in the area of air safety
was one of the primary 'objects sought to be obtained' by
passage of the [1958] Act."3 9 In addition, the court in
French stated, in agreement with the Court of Appeals of the
Second Circuit, that Congress passed the 1958 Act to give
the FAA authority to establish rules for the safe use of the
nation's airspace so that only one authority would have this
responsibility. 140
In view of the above, an aircraft manufacturer would as-
sume that Congress intended only federal laws and regula-
'-, Id. See Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (holding
that states and localities could not regulate aircraft noise and stating that "[i]t is the
pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to
conclude that there is pre-emption") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice
Rehnquist stated that "[t]he paramount substantive concerns of Congress were to
regulate federally all aspects of air safety," and that "Congress clearly intended to
pre-empt the States from regulating aircraft in flight." Id. at 644. See also Bieneman
v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that imposition of state tort
law to dictate aircraft design standards to regulate aircraft noise is preempted), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989).





tions to govern the field of aircraft safety. Therefore,
federal law should not permit the use of state common law,
as applied through a jury, to hold an aircraft manufacturer
to a standard that is derived by the jury.
2. Injured Party's Arguments
A party, injured as a result of a defectively designed air-
craft, would contend that while Congress has the power and
authority to regulate a field to the exclusion of the states,
Congress did not intend to occupy the field of aircraft
safety in this manner. Therefore, Congress did not intend
to preempt state tort law regarding aircraft safety. Further-
more, the injured party could find support for this argu-
ment in English v. General Electric Co.t 41 The Supreme
Court, in English, emphasized that when the United States
has traditionally occupied a field, there must be "clear and
manifest" intent by Congress to supersede state laws.
142
Therefore, since states have traditionally occupied the field
of aircraft regulation, 143 state common law claims with re-
spect to defectively designed aircraft should not be pre-
empted unless it can be clearly and manifestly shown that
Congress intended otherwise. In addition, due to the inclu-
sion of a savings clause'4 in the 1958 Act and the strict re-
quirements that the Supreme Court has dictated in order
for preemption to apply, state common law tort claims in
this context should not be preempted.
a. Savings Clause
As originally enacted, the 1958 Act included a savings
clause.' 45 The savings clause states that the 1958 Act shall
not "abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
141 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
142 Id. at 79 (holding that a state law claim against a nuclear industry company for
intentional infliction of emotional distress on a former employee was not preempted
by federal law); see asoJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
143 See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.
" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
1 Id. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addi-
tion to such remedies."1 46 In Brunwasser v. Trans World Air-
lines the court held that Section 1506 "recognizes that the
statutory scheme established by the Federal Aviation Act is
designed merely to complement existing statutory and com-
mon law remedies, not to supplant them."1 47 In addition,
the court stated that it was "clear that 49 U.S.C. § 1506 ap-
plies to remedies arising under state law as well as those
created under federal law."1 48 In view of this and by the
very nature of the wording of the savings clause, the savings
clause leaves in place statutory and common law remedies
that existed at the time the 1958 Act was enacted.
What statutory and common law remedies existed at the
time Section 1506 was enacted? In Piper Aircraft, the court
stated that "[t] ort liability for design defects was established
in the law of many states by the late 1950s and had been
extended to airplane crash cases." 149 The savings clause al-
lows state law remedies for torts. In fact, many courts have
found that Congress intended the savings clause to exclu-
sively occupy the field of aircraft safety and "to allow state
common law to stand side by side with the system of federal
regulations.... -150
146 Id.
147 541 F. Supp. 1338, 1345 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that state common law
claims remained unaffected by the federal regulation of air travel).
I's Id. See also In reAir Crash Disaster atJohn F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24,
1975, 635 F.2d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1980); Porter v. Southeastern Aviation, 191 F.
Supp. 42, 43 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 298-300
(1976).
149 985 F.2d at 1443 (citing DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88, 96-97
(E.D.N.Y. 1951); see also Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions
for Use of a Produc4 71 YALE L.J. 816, 821 (1962)).
1- 985 F.2d at 1444. See Sunbird Air Servs., Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 789 F.
Supp. 360, 362 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that injured party's state law claims were not
preempted by the 1958 Act); Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 37 Cal. 3d 540, 549
(Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1985) (holding aircraft manufacturer liable
for negligence in design of an aircraft); In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy
Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 635 F.2d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the
federal statute does not preclude common law remedies based on the inclusion of
the savings clause in the 1958 Act); Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F.
Supp. 1396, 1399 (D. Haw. 1990) (holding that the injured party's crashworthiness
claims were not preempted by the 1958 Act).
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In addition to the inclusion of the savings clause, the
1958 Act was amended to include a provision which stated
that "no State... shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regu-
lation, standard, or other provision having the force and
effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services" of any air
carrier.1 5 1 There is an express provision in the 1958 Act
stating that nothing shall abridge existing common law
remedies, 5 2 and a provision expressly preempting state law
regarding rates, routes and services, but not the state law
regarding aircraft safety.15 3 In 1992, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of the 1958 Act's savings clause impact on
state laws prohibiting deceptive advertising of air fares.
15 4
The Court determined that because the 1958 Act contained
the savings clause and did not contain any express preemp-
tion clause, the states retained their traditional powers in
the field.1 55
b. Standards for Preemption as Elaborated by the
Supreme Court in Cipollone
An injured party would argue that the 1958 Act and its
subsequent amendments, govern only two basic areas of avi-
ation: (1) aircraft safety and (2) airline rates and routes.1 56
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 amended the 1958
Act to include a provision whereby state common law claims
were expressly preempted regarding airline "rates, routes
and services." 157 Neither the 1958 Act nor the Airline De-
regulation Act, however, included a provision expressly pre-
empting state common law tort claims regarding aircraft
safety. In situations where Congress has expressly pre-
15, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988) repealed by Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat.
1379 (1994). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
15 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
" See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988) repealed by Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat.
1379 (1994).
- See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
1 Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2037-38. See California v. CAB, 581 F.2d 954, 956 (1978),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979). See also Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290,
.300 (1976).
- See supra note 39-40 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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empted some types of state law actions but not others, the
"courts are cautious about relying on implied pre-emption
theories to limit state authority further."158
In 1991, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of im-
plied preemption versus express preemption in the context
of cigarette labeling and advertising. 159 In Cipollone, the ma-
jority stated that
[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption
and has included in the enacted legislation a provision ex-
plicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision pro-
vides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congres-
sional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive pro-
visions of the legislation. Such reasoning is a variant of the
familiar principle of expression unius est exclusio alterius:
Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emp-
tive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach
are not pre-empted.... Therefore, [courts] need only iden-
tify the domain expressly pre-empted by each of those
sections. 160
The 1958 Act and its subsequent amendments only explic-
itly preempt state laws with regard to rates and routes, and
not to aircraft safety, therefore, state common law claims
regarding aircraft safety should not be preempted. In addi-
tion, Justice Scalia stated in his dissenting opinion that, with
respect to field preemption, "[t]he existence of an express
pre-emption provision tends to contradict any inference
that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the
statute's express language defines." 161
In the present context, Congress considered the issue of
preemption and enacted Section 1305(a). Furthermore,
Section 1305(a) provides a "reliable indicium of congres-
15 Lake Aircraft 992 F.2d at 294.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (refusing to apply im-
plied preemption but interpreting the express preemption provisions to preempt
selective state common law claims).
- Id. at 2617-18 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
6 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
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sional intent with respect to state authority."162 Therefore,
in view of Cipollone, preemption should be limited to the
express language of Section 1305(a), and state tort law
claims should not be preempted because they do not fall
within the domain of the state actions expressly preempted
by Section 1305(a). i6 3
Even though Section 1305(a) was not enacted as part of
the 1958 Act, its inclusion in the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978 establishes that the 1958 Act lacked general pre-
emptive authority.'6 Congress considered safety concerns
when enacting the Airline Deregulation Act, yet, did not
include an express preemption provision regarding
safety. 165 Instead, Congress merely directed the Secretary
of Transportation to prepare annual reports on air safety,
to prevent degradation in air safety; and gave the Secretary
of Transportation the power to promulgate new safety regu-
lations as needed1 66 These requirements are consistent
with current state common law duties, and they show Con-
gress's lack of intent to preempt state common law claims
regarding aircraft design defects.1 67
Therefore, Congress did not intend to preempt state
common law regarding aircraft safety. Moreover, even if
Congress intended for the federal government to have an
162 See Cippollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 505 (1978)). The importance of Section 1305(a) lies in the fact that in the
enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act, Congress specifically did not preempt
state action regarding aircraft safety. Therefore, Congress must not have intended
for such actions to be preempted because they specifically preempted other facets of
air travel and not aircraft safety. Therefore, the repeal of Section 1305(a) in 1994,
does not change the fact that Congress did not, and still has not, expressed an intent
to preempt state actions involving aircraft safety.
165 See PiperAircraft, 985 F.2d at 1444. The court in PiperAircraft relied on the fact
that the 1958 Act and its subsequent amendments govern two areas and only one,
rates and routes, contains an express preemption provision. In view of this, the
court concluded that "[u]nder Cipollone, this implies that the other broad area of
congressional concern - air safety - is not preempted because it is 'beyond [the]




16 Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 107(b), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 92 Stat. 1705, 1709-10.
167 Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1444 n.17.
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exclusive right to regulate safety in a field, the states are
allowed to maintain tort remedies covering the same basic
field.1 68 In fact, the recovery of damages based on a state
common law tort theory may be permitted even if the result
is direct state regulation.16 9
3. Aircraft Manufacturer's Rebuttal
a. Savings Clause
As illustrated above, an injured party may argue that fed-
eral preemption does not apply in the context of allegedly
defective aircraft design. 170 The inclusion of the savings
clause in the 1958 Act arguably demonstrates that Congress
did not intend to exclusively occupy the field of aircraft
safety and, instead intended for state common law to stand
side by side with federal regulations. 7 ' This, however, does
not seem to be the intent of Congress when it enacted the
savings clause in 1958.
The central issue in the instant case, an aircraft manufac-
turer would argue, is not whether the states have any inter-
est in aircraft safety but whether the states can subject an
aircraft manufacturer to stricter standards and regulations
than those dictated by the federal government. The savings
clause does not address this issue. The savings clause specif-
ically protects "the remedies now existing at common law or
by statute."1 72 Therefore, Congress has only preserved state
common law remedies and retained for the states a limited
place in the field of aircraft safety. It is important to reiter-
ate, however, that the savings clause merely preserves "rem-
edies" that existed under state common law at the
enactment of the 1958 Act and says nothing about preserv-
ing state standards or regulations, or state common law lia-
168 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 253 (1984).
-e See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
170 See 992 F.2d at 295.
171 See id. at 295 n.5.
172 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988) (emphasis added).
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bility in the context of aircraft safety.17 3  Therefore, the
injured party's argument that a state common law tort liabil-
ity claim is preserved by the preservation of remedies in the
savings clause is unfounded because these are two com-
pletely separate and distinct legal concepts.1
7 4
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in Bieneman v. City of
Chicago supports this conclusion. 7 5 The court addressed
the limited effect of the savings clause in the 1958 Act on
implied preemption and stated that "[s] tatutes of this sort
save common law remedies even when federal law exclusively
determines the content of substantive rules." 7 6 In addi-
tion, the court found that "[s]tate courts award damages
every day in air crash cases, notwithstanding that federal law
preempts the regulation of safety in air travel." 17 7 Further-
more, the court stressed that "[t] he essential point [was] that
the state may employ damages remedies only to enforce
federal requirements." 1 7  The court concluded that the in-
jured party's complaints about alleged noise related design
defects were governed by the 1958 Act and its subsequent
amendments, and held that "a state may not use common
law procedures to question federal decisions or extract
money from those who abide by them."1 79 Therefore, the
'7' If an aircraft manufacturer is held liable under state common law for damages
sustained by an injured party to himself and his aircraft due to an allegedly defective
aircraft design, then does that not prescribe a standard upon the aircraft manufac-
turer that is dictated by the state? In addition, in a case where the aircraft manufac-
turer has completely followed all FAA regulations but is still held liable under state
common law, are the courts not displacing the elaborate and exclusive federal sys-
tem for regulating aircraft design and replacing it with standards dictated by state
common law?
174 Liability is defined as "an obligation to do or refrain from doing something; a
duty which eventually must be performed...." BARRON's LAw DicrioNaRv 275 (3rd
ed. 1991). Whereas a remedy is defined as a procedural device by which a "means
[is] employed to enforce or redress an injury." Id. at 409.
, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1080 (1989) (addressing the
issue of implied preemption with respect to noise related aircraft design).
i76 Id. at 471 (emphasis added). Therefore, an injured party would only retain the
ability to receive compensatory remedies for a manufacturer's violation of an appli-
cable standard of design safety. However, those remedies should only be exercised
in a manner that furthers compliance with federal safety standards.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 473.
19 Id. In support of this conclusion the court stated that:
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savings clause does not preserve state common law claims
and will only support state common law remedies where
they are in accordance with federal regulations or within
federally-sanctioned state authority.18 0
Finally, the Supreme Court, in Morales, stated that "[a]
general 'remedies' savings clause cannot be allowed to su-
persede" a more specific showing of Congressional intent to
preempt state common law claims.18 ' In view of this state-
ment, and statements of the the court of appeals in
Bieneman, the savings clause should not preserve a state
common law claim.
b. Standards for Preemption as Elaborated in Cipollone
The injured party's arguments misconstrued or misap-
plied the recitations of Cipollone. First, the injured party re-
lied on the statement that "the historic police powers of the
States [are], not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless
that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."182
Aircraft design does not involve any historic police powers
of the states and it is not "a subject traditionally governed
by state law.""8 3 Prior to the 1958 Act, Congress urged the
states to adopt "uniform laws and regulations correspond-
ing with the provisions of [the 1926 Act] and the rules and
regulations that [were] promulgated under it.""8 4 In re-
sponse, forty-seven states adopted provisions similar to that
[ain award of damages is compensatory from [the injured party's] per-
spective, but from [the airport's] it is no different from regulation.
The airport and the air carriers see the award of damages as a signal to
stop doing whatever led to the decision, just as the monetary penalty
for violating an express substantive rule would lead them to desist.
Id. at 472. See Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (stating that "regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preven-
tive relief").
,so See 864 F.2d at 473.
1 112 S. Ct. at 2037.
- 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quotation marks omitted).
183 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct 1732, 1737 (1993).
184 S. REP. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1925), repinted in CrvrL AERONAUTICS:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE Acr OF 1926 at 29 (Rev. ed. 1943).
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of the 1926 Act by the mid to late 1930s.18 - Moreover, since
the late 1930s, the design standards promulgated by the
federal government have effectively governed the designs of
all U.S. aircraft, whether used in interstate or intrastate
travel. 186 In addition, the House Report regarding the en-
actment of the 1958 Act made it clear that Congress in-
tended to give the FAA "full responsibility and authority for
the advancement and promotion of civil aeronautics gener-
ally, including the promulgation and enforcement of safety
regulations... [and] plenary authority to... [m]ake and
enforce safety regulations governing the design and opera-
tion of civil aircraft."
1 8 7
Second, the injured party's argument relies on the recita-
tion in Cipollone that where Congress has included an ex-
press preemption provision""' in enacting legislation and
where that provision provides a "reliable indicium" of in-
tent to preempt, then "there is no need to infer congres-
sional intent to preempt state laws.""8 9 By enacting Section
1305(a) Congress did not provide a "reliable indicium" of
intent. This can be seen from the fact that the 1958 Act
established the FAA and gave it the authority to regulate
aircraft safety. In addition, the 1958 Act explicitly estab-
lished the standards and regulations regarding aircraft de-
sign safety. Furthermore, Section 1305(a) was not enacted
until 1978, therefore, it is not possible that an express pre-
emption provision, enacted twenty years after the FAA was
established, could provide a "reliable indicium of congres-
sional intent" with respect to the dominion of the FAA. In
addition, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which in-
cluded Section 1305 (a), was enacted to address commercial
18 See NICK A. KOMONS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., BONFIRES TO BEACONS: FEDERAL
CIVIL AVIATION POLICY UNDER THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926-1938 at 122 (1978).
186 See id.
187 H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3741-42.
- See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) for the express preemption provision.
log CipoUone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting California Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)). See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
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airline operations and not aircraft design.190 In view of this,
there is no reason to believe that Congress did not intend
to occupy the field of aircraft design regulation.
In support of this conclusion, the court in French v. Pan
Am Express, Inc.191 preempted a state claim to enjoin an air-
line from testing a pilot for drugs. This case was decided
after the enactment of Section 1305(a) and was based on
implied preemption. In response to the injured party's
contention that "by specifically defining certain areas of avi-
ation which Congress intended to preempt, [this] implies
that Congress intended to limit the areas preempted to,
those named," the court stated that Section 1305(a) "af-
fords no basis for concluding that Congress meant to leave
states free to regulate on all other issues anent air safety."
192
Another reason for not using the injured party's interpre-
tation of Cipollone is that by following the injured party's
reasoning, at least one seminal case 1 3 would now be de-
cided the opposite way. City of Burbank concluded that im-
plied preemption applied in the area of aircraft noise.
1 94
The only dispute in the case was the scope of the preemp-
tion. City of Burbank, however, was decided prior to the en-
actment of Section 1305(a). Therefore, under the injured
party's interpretation of Cipollone, if City of Burbank would
have been decided in 1979, then the outcome of the case
would have been the exact opposite. States would have
been able to regulate aircraft because "the pervasive nature
of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise" would
9 This is reflected in the wording of Section 1305(a). Section 1305(a) provides
that state claims are preempted With respect to "rates, routes or services of any air
carrier." This does not even hint of aircraft design. Also note that whatever effect
Section 1305(a) had before 1994, it no longer has because it has been repealed.
Therefore, not only does it not apply regarding aircraft design, it no longer applies
to rates and routes.
869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
19 Id. at 3 (relying on City of Burbank and stating that the Supreme Court seem-
ingly rejected the idea that Congress intended for Section 1305(a) to be interpreted
in such a way that all areas outside of those covered in Section 1305(a) were not
subject to implied preemption).
9 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
'9 Id. at 640.
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have been overlooked in light of Section 1305(a).195 This
result is clearly in contradiction to the accepted holdings of
the courts today. Therefore, the injured party's analysis of
Cippollone should not be followed and implied preemption
is proper in both City of Burbank and the present context.
B. CONFLICT PREEMPTION
1. Aircraft Manufacturer's Arguments
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have held that "state law is pre-empted when it actually con-
flicts with federal law."196 In a situation where the federal
government has enacted a detailed and pervasive regulatory
scheme in a specific field and a state also attempts to regu-
late that same field, the state regulations should be pre-
empted unless they are consistent with the federal
regulations. Hence, an injured party's state common law
tort claim should be preempted if an aircraft manufacturer
can show that (1) the federal regulatory scheme regarding
aircraft safety is both pervasive and detailed, and (2) the
injured party's claim is a form of state-imposed regulation
which is inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme.
In the field of aircraft safety, Congress has enacted de-
tailed and pervasive regulatory schemes. First, all aircraft
designs must receive a type certification 197 and a produc-
tion certification 9 8 from the FAA before an aircraft can be
manufactured. These certifications require that the aircraft
be of "proper design, material, specification, construction,
and performance ... and meet[ ]the minimum standards,
rules, and regulations prescribed by the" FAA.'" Second,
all aircraft must receive an "airworthiness certificate"
20 0
before any person can operate the aircraft. This certifica-
195 Id. at 633.
- Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988).
19 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a) (b) (1988); see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying
text.
198 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(b) (1988); see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
19 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a) (1988).
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(c) (1988).
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tion gives the FAA the discretion to prescribe "the type of
service for which the aircraft may be used, and such other
terms, conditions, and limitations, as are required in the
interest of safety."20 1 Third, the FAA has the discretion to
forbid an aircraft from flying due to modifications to the
aircraft and to forbid a class of aircraft from flying in view of
its service history.20 2
The federal regulatory scheme is pervasive and the in-
jured party's claim, based on state common law tort theory,
is directly and overtly regulatory. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that " 'regulation can be as effectively ex-
erted through an award of damages as through some form
of preventive relief.' "203 Furthermore, if an aircraft manu-
facturer is found liable for an alleged design defect by one
state court, then the manufacturer may be held to the stan-
dard dictated by that state court in other state courts.
Therefore, the standard dictated by the court is a form of
regulation, 20 4 and if it is not entirely consistent with the ac-
cepted regulatory scheme then it should be preempted.
2. Injured Party's Arguments
A conflict between federal law or regulatory scheme and
state law exists "when it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."2 °5 In the context of aircraft safety,
a conflict between state law and the federal regulatory
I d.
49 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(2) (1988).
-3 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992) (quoting San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). The majority
stated that common law standards of care impose "requirements or prohibitions" on
alleged tortfeasors and, therefore, rejected the view that preemption was limited to
positive enactments by legislatures and agencies. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619.
04 Note also that a large award for the injured party places substantial economic
pressure on aircraft manufacturers to design their aircraft to the standards dictated
by courts.
205 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (citations omitted); see California
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); see also Morseburg v. Balyon 621 F.2d 972,
978 (9th Cir.) ("The crucial inquiry is not whether state law reaches matters also
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scheme should not be found to exist for at least two rea-
sons. First, "the federal law at issue does no more than set
forth '[s]uch minimum standards governing the design,
materials, workmanship, construction, and performance of
aircraft... as may be required in the interest of safety.' "206
As can be seen from this quote, neither this regulation, nor
any of the other regulations, dictates a precise design of an
aircraft. Therefore, if a state court finds an aircraft manu-
facturer liable because a particular element of an aircraft
was defective, the decision would not conflict with the fed-
eral regulations since they do not specify the particular re-
quirement of the element.
In addition, the federal regulatory scheme only autho-
rizes the promulgation of "minimum standards." Standing
alone, "minimum standards such as these are not conclu-
sive of Congress's preemptive intent."20 7 By designating the
regulation as "minimum," Congress has "indicated that it
did not want to bar states from adopting additional or more
stringent standards."20
8
Furthermore, the federal regulatory scheme merely au-
thorizes the FAA to provide certification of aircraft.2 0 9 By
suing an aircraft manufacturer under state common law
subject to federal regulation, but whether the two laws function harmoniously rather
than discordantly."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
'z Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D. Haw.
1990) (emphasis added) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (a) (1)).
207 Piper Aircraft 985 F.2d at 1445 (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 168 n.19 (1978).
Id.; see Holiday, 747 F. Supp. at 1401 (stating that "nothing in the [1958 Act]
indicates that states may not require aircraft to be more safe or better designed");
Sunbird Air Servs., Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., No. 89-2181-V, 1992 WL 167279 at
*3 (D. Kan. June 10, 1992) (stating that "states are thus free to impose 'stronger'
safety standards by setting a legal standard of liability for aircraft safety"); see also
Perry v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1992)
(addressing "minimum standards" requirement for automobiles). In Piper Aircraft
the aircraft manufacturer argued that Congress intended the "minimum standards"
limitation to allow manufacturers to adopt designs and methods that would improve
safety beyond the standards required by the federal regulatory scheme, and did not
intend to allow states to establish regulations which would heighten the safety stan-
dards. In response to this argument, the court stated that since there were no "clear
and manifest indicators" of such an intent, then such an intent would not be pre-
sumed. Piper Aircraf, 985 F.2d at 1445.
- See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423 (1988).
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tort theory, the injured party "does not challenge the power
of the FAA to adopt safety regulations or to certify aircraft
as complying with those regulations."2 10 A claim based on
state common law tort theory does not even effect the valid-
ity of the FAA's certification decisions.21
Second, if a court were to find a conflict, an aircraft man-
ufacturer could escape liability for a defectively designed
product by merely complying with the "minimum stan-
dards" promulgated by the FAA. In some circumstances, a
design defect will not be found upon the initial testing of
the aircraft.21 2 In fact, "[e]xperience has shown that defects
in design and manufacture of an aircraft may not become
evident until after an aircraft has been in operation for
some time."2 1 3 Therefore, an injured party's state common
law tort claim should not be barred because the FAA."over-
looked or was unaware of the defective condition [of the
aircraft] at the time the aircraft was certified."21 4
3. Aircraft Manufacturer's Rebuttal
As was noted in the injured party's argument, Congress,
through the 1958 Act, has given the FAA the duty and au-
thority to prescribe and revise "[s]uch minimum standards
... as may be required in the interest of safety."2 15 How-
ever, the injured party's interpretation of "minimum stan-
dards" is erroneous for two basic reasons. First, the injured
party's interpretation is contrary to Supreme Court prece-
21o Elsworth, 691 P.2d at 635.
211 Id.
212 See HoUiday, 747 F. Supp. at 1401.
213 Id.
21, Id. If conflict preemption applies and the injured party's claim is barred, then
two undesirable effects may result. One effect is that this may "encourage aircraft
manufacturers to cut corners in order to obtain an airworthiness certificate at the
earliest possible date, without sufficient consideration of potential design problems,
since once the airworthiness certificate is issued, the manufacturer is ... effectively
immunized from all liability under state tort law." Id, Another effect is that it would
force the federal courts to adopt their own common law tort theories so as to com-
pensate the multitude of injured persons who would have no other means of receiv-
ing compensation.
215 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421 (a)(1) (1988); see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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dent.216 Second, this interpretation is contrary to the con-
gressional purpose and intent of the 1958 Act and its
predecessors.
In Ray the owners and operators of oil tankers chal-
lenged state imposed safety regulations on ships on the ba-
sis that the state regulations were preempted by the federal
regulatory scheme. Congress enacted legislation which del-
egated to the Secretary of Transportation and the Coast
Guard the duty and authority to promulgate "minimum
standards" of design and construction of ships to promote
ship safety and the protection of the environment.217 In or-
der to accomplish this duty, Congress gave the Secretary of
Transportation the responsibility to certify each ship and to
make periodic inspections of each ship.218
Even though the federal regulations merely provided
"minimum standards" regarding design safety, the Supreme
Court in Ray concluded that these regulations preempted
state safety laws addressing the same subject matter.21 9 In
so holding, the Court rejected the contention that a statute
merely involving the promulgation of "minimum stan-
dards" evidences a Congressional intent to allow the states
to enact regulations addressing the same schemes.220 Fur-
thermore, the Court concluded the following:
[t]his statutory pattern shows that Congress, insofar as de-
sign characteristics are concerned, has entrusted to the Sec-
retary [of Transportation] the duty of determining which oil
tankers are sufficiently safe... [and that] [t] his indicates to
us that Congress intended uniform national standards for
design and construction of tankers that would foreclose the
imposition of different or more stringent state require-
ments. In particular, as we see it, Congress did not antici-
216 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
M See 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. 1970).
218 Id.
29 Ray, 435 U.S. at 163-64.
- Id. at 168 n.19. The court specifically rejected the proposition that since the
federal scheme speaks of "minimum standards" that Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), "requires recognition of state authority to
impose higher standards than the Secretary has prescribed." Ray, 435 U.S. at 168
n.19.
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pate that a vessel found to be in compliance with the
Secretary's design and construction regulations and holding
a Secretary's permit, or its equivalent... would nevertheless
be barred by state law from operating in the navigable wa-
ters of the United States on the ground that its design char-
acteristics constitute an undue hazard.221
In view of the statements by the Supreme Court and its
ultimate holding in Ray, the 1958 Act should preempt a
state common law tort claim based on aircraft safety. This
argument seems especially compelling since the federal reg-
ulatory scheme at issue in Ray is identical to the regulatory
scheme as defined by the 1958 Act.222 As in Ray, the Secre-
tary of Transportation and the FAA have "promulgated a
comprehensive set of regulations" in accordance with their
responsibilities and duties. 23 Therefore, in view of Ray, the
statutory scheme of the 1958 Act makes it clear that Con-
gress "intended uniform national standards"22 4 in the con-
text of aircraft safety, set by a singular federal agency for the
design and construction of aircraft.
IV. CONCLUSION
The arguments for each side appear to be both credible
and persuasive. If the conclusion is that there is no pre-
emption, then the aircraft manufacturers will face differing
standards and liability issues every time one of their aircraft
enters a different state, and the FAA will basically be ren-
dered toothless. However, if the conclusion is that preemp-
tion applies, the injured parties will be at the mercy of a
federal organization to provide for their losses. This be-
comes extremely unpalatable when one considers that most
federal organizations are overworked, and do not have the
time nor the resources to give every claim proper
treatment.
2 Ray, 435 U.S. at 163-64.
Compare ship safety statutes, supra note 203 and accompanying text, with air-
craft safety statutes, supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
's United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 805 (1984).
Ray, 435 U.S. at 152.
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In view of this fact, the best solution may be for Congress
to pass explicit legislation that establishes guidelines for
every aircraft manufacturer and state to follow. If this legis-
lation includes a provision allowing state laws to address
these issues, then the standard set out in these state laws
must be consistent with all other states and must be accepta-
ble to the FAA. Therefore, the standards would be set by
both the states and the federal government. However,
these standards need to be established promptly and made
relatively difficult to change, because aircraft manufactur-
ers must be given a chance to adapt their designs to con-
form to these new regulations. Adopting regulations on an
ad hoc basis would allow injured parties to recover for dam-
ages at the expense of the aircraft manufacturers and own-
ers, but it would not give the aircraft manufacturers a
chance to alter their designs to comply with these regula-
tions before subjecting themselves to potential liability.
The best system of regulation would be one that the aircraft
manufacturers knew of and could follow, and that would
require aircraft that are free from design defects.
If, however, the legislation includes a provision expressly
preempting state common law claims, then at least two ad-
ditional steps must be taken. First, there must be a proce-
dure to establish a periodic review of the FAA regulations
by an impartial organization. The impartial organization
should be comprised of experts in the aircraft industry who
are familiar with both the technical and the legal aspects of
aircraft safety. In addition, if, from this review, the FAA reg-
ulations are found to be lacking, then the regulations
should be quickly amended to correct the defect. There
should then be some form of compensation provided to
parties who were injured due to a defectively designed air-
craft that complied with the erroneous regulation. Second,
a low-cost system of compensation must be established for
persons who were injured due to an alleged defect in an
aircraft. Therefore, if an aircraft design has complied with
all of the federal regulations, and the federal regulations
are not defective in any way, an injured party can at least
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recover for some of his or her expenses. This system could
be similar to the present insurance system, but instead of
just the aircraft owner or the aircraft manufacturer purchas-
ing the policy, both parties should contribute to the pay-
ment of the policy. In this way, neither party would bear
the entire burden of paying for the insurance.
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